Amicus Curiae Brief of
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington

A. Quid Pro Quos Involving Super PAC Contributions

The Appellants cited below several cases where contributions to super PACs were the quid in an illegal bribery scheme. Those cases show that the likelihood a contribution to a super PAC could be part of a quid pro quo exchange is materially greater than "zero."

1. The Logic of a Bribe Where a Candidate "Placed Subjective Value" on Super PAC Contributions

The parties cover at length the bribery prosecution of former U.S. Senator Bob Menendez, who was indicted for allegedly accepting bribes, in part, in the form of contributions to a super PAC. See United States v. Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 3d 606, 621 (D.N.J. 2018); United States v. Menendez, 132 F. Supp. 3d 635, 640 (D.N.J. 2015). Most relevant here—and directly refuting the "unanimous" premise of the other courts—the district court recognized that "ample evidence" showed that "Menendez placed subjective value on" contributions to the super PAC, notwithstanding the fact the super PAC was not part of the scheme, supported multiple candidates, and was not coordinating its activities with Menendez. Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 623.

Accordingly, irrespective of whether the government met its heightened burden to prove an "explicit" quid pro quo agreement between the super PAC donor and the Senator beyond a reasonable doubt, see id. at 624–25, 634–35, the evidence shows there is nothing "[il]logical" about a super PAC contribution bribe. Indeed, the difficulty in prosecuting such agreements after-the-fact merely underscores the need to prevent them beforehand. Senator Menendez was subsequently convicted in a different bribery scheme. See United States v. Menendez, 759 F. Supp. 3d 460, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

2. A "half million" Super PAC Contribution Quid for a Firing Quo

In another matter, a jury convicted Greg Lindberg of paying bribes to the Commissioner of the North Carolina Department of Insurance in exchange for the commissioner removing a deputy responsible for overseeing Lindberg's insurance companies. United States v. Lindberg, 476 F. Supp. 3d 240, 246–47, 253–54 (W.D.N.C. 2020). As part of that bribery scheme, Lindberg created and funded an independent expenditure committee to support the commissioner. Lindberg, 476 F. Supp. 3d at 250 (quoting Lindberg offering to "put in a million or two" as the "sole donor").

There was no evidence that the Commissioner solicited this contribution, or that the committee subsequently coordinated with the commissioner. In fact, the agreement specified there "could not be 'any coordination'" between the commissioner and the committee. Lindberg, 476 F. Supp. 3d at 251. Rather, it would simply be run by someone the commissioner would "have confidence in." Id. at 250. As part of the scheme, the conspirators agreed to route some of the funds through a nonprofit section 501(c)(4) entity that would permit Lindberg to "stay anonymous on the source of [all] the money," Id. at 252 (agreeing to contribute another half-a-million directly to a section 527 entity that would disclose Lindberg as the source, but to use a (c)(4) to hide the total amount of Lindberg's support).

Although an initial conviction was vacated over improper jury instructions, see United States v. Lindberg, 39 F.4th 141 (4th Cir. 2022), Lindberg was again convicted on retrial with proper instructions. DOJ, Chairman of Multinational Investment Company and Company Consultant Convicted in Bribery Scheme at Retrial (May 16, 2024).

3. $1 million Super PAC Contribution Quid for a Bailout Quo

Also covered extensively by the Appellants, the prosecution of former Ohio Speaker Larry Householder serves as another example of bribes using super PACs. As part of a larger bribery scheme, a utility contributed funds to super PACs for Householder to use to further his bid for the speakership. See Matt Corley, Three dark money lessons from the Larry Householder corruption prosecution, CREW (Mar. 29, 2023). There was nothing at the time of the scheme to indicate that Householder controlled the super PACs or coordinated on any of their communications. See United States v. Householder, 137 F.4th 454, 464 (6th Cir. 2025) (detailing use of vehicles to conceal source of funds); Second Am. Complaint ¶¶ 59, 89, Ohio v. FirstEnergy, No. 20 CV 006281 (Ct. of Comm. Pleas, Ohio Aug. 5, 2021) (alleging scheme to "prevent the public and regulators from discovering their efforts to influence the outcome of the 2018 Ohio Primary Election"). Accordingly, there was no way for the public to enforce anti-coordination rules in a way that could prevent the quid pro quo.

4. A New Funded Supportive Super PAC Quid For Help With an Examination Quo

In another case, the governor of Puerto Rico was indicted in an apparent bribery scheme involving contributions to a super PAC. United States v. Vazquez Garced, 22-cr-342 (D.P.R. 2022). The alleged scheme involved the governor agreeing to remove an official examining a bank in exchange for, in part, the bank owner setting up and funding a super PAC to support the governor. The alleged scheme involved the governor agreeing to remove an official examining a bank in exchange for, in part, the bank owner setting up and funding a super PAC to support the governor. There was no allegation, however, that the governor would control the super PAC or coordinate on its expenditures—rather, she simply could expect support because that was the terms of the agreement. The Governor pled guilty to a lesser included charge of accepting an excessive contribution. Patricia Mazzei and Glenn Thrush, Former Puerto Rico Governor Pleads Guilty to Campaign Finance Violation, N.Y. Times (Aug. 27, 2025).

Each of the above examples disproves the premise underlying the "seemingly unanimous consensus" of other courts: that contributions to super PACs will be of so little value because of their supposed independence that candidates would not trade official acts for them.

Notably, all the quid pro quo examples above involve an agreement between a candidate and a contributor, but not the independent expenditure maker. In the Menendez example, there was no allegation that the independent expenditure group was even aware of the corrupt bargain behind the contribution. The prevalence of contributors in these corrupt bargains may be because the contributors, unlike the independent expenditure makers, have a variety of interests other than the election of candidates, and so may trade support they may not otherwise give to advance those interests. Further, contributors enjoy potential anonymity that does not attach to the independent expenditure maker. In the Householder and Lindberg examples, the ability of independent expenditure groups to accept unlimited funds from intermediary 501(c)(4) entities that shielded the sources was instrumental in the corrupt bargain. Further, transferring the money to entities that are repeat players and therefore reliably and effective allies of an officeholder, may make those transfers much more valuable, and therefore much more likely to result in a quid pro quo, than an offer to spend the funds directly would.

Regardless, whether or not the actual expenditure of funds independently from a campaign "give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption," Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010), the above examples show that contributions to independent expenditure groups can and do.

B. Candidates Value Super PAC Contributions, and Contributors Know It

The above examples stem from criminal bribery prosecutions, but prosecutions that must be proven beyond reasonable doubt will "'deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental action.'" Libertarian Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 924 F.3d 533, 543–44 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976)) ("[I]f [bribery] laws were sufficient to achieve the government's compelling interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption and its appearance, then Congress would have had no need in the first place to impose contribution limits to combat prior decades' 'deeply disturbing' quid pro quo arrangements."). Rather, the value that candidates place on super PACs that gave rise to the above prosecutions is evidently widely shared.

Candidates now routinely fundraise for super PACs, demonstrating the value on which they place their funding. See, e.g., Max Greenwood and Ana Ceballos, Trump to attend high-dollar 'roundtable' with donors in Doral on Thursday, Miami Herald (Mar. 21, 2024) (reporting then candidate Trump's attendance at fundraiser for supportive super PAC); Edward-Isaac Dovere, Hakeem Jeffries is staging a takeover of the New York Democrats. His Hope to become speaker may depend on it, CNN (June 28, 2023) (reporting House Democratic leader "pitch[ed] some of [New York's] biggest Democratic donors to spend their money locally with the House Majority super PAC"); Ted Johnson, Hollywood, L.A. Figures Raise Money For Democratic PAC To Win Senate Control, Deadline (Oct. 8, 2020) (reporting Senate Minority Leader co-hosted a fundraiser for independent expenditure group); Manu Raju, How McConnell is maneuvering to keep the Senate in GOP hands – and navigating Trump, CNN (Sept. 10, 2020) (reporting Senate Leader "regularly doing fundraising calls and Zoom meetings with donors to help" allied independent expenditure organization); Reid Wilson, Inside the GOP's Effort to Consolidate the Super PAC Universe, Morning Consult (Mar. 24, 2016) (reporting Senate Leader told other Senators they "should steer big donors to" two independent expenditure organizations). President Trump's campaign announced in the 2020 election that a supposedly independent super PAC was the "approved outside non-campaign group" because it was "run by allies of the President and is a trusted supporter of President Trump's policies and agendas." Donald J. Trump for President Campaign, Trump Campaign Statement on Dishonest Fundraising Groups (May 7, 2019). President Biden switched the supposedly independent groups to which his campaign drove donors in the course of his 2024 campaign. Shane Goldmacher and Reid J. Epstein, Biden Switches Up His Big-Money Operation Ahead of 2024, N.Y. Times (July 14, 2023).

Super PACs are often staffed by "trusted" campaign surrogates. Trump Campaign Statement. "[C]andidates' top aides … now leav[e] campaign teams to work for supportive super PACs." Brent Ferguson, Super PACs: Gobbling Up Democracy?, Brennan Center for Justice (June 23, 2015). For example, the president of the principal super PAC supporting the democratic presidential candidate in 2024 formerly worked for the democratic party. Nick Corasaniti, A Democratic Super PAC Surge Helps Biden Expand His Map, N.Y. Times (Oct. 22, 2020). In another example, "[a] group of former Trump aides designed the super PAC America First Action." Ashley Balcerzak, Inside Donald Trump's army of super PACS and MAGA nonprofits, The Center for Public Integrity (Feb. 18, 2019).

The parties have created their own super PACS while appearing to take the minimum steps to assert their independence. Ian Vandewalker, Dark Money from Shadow Parties is Booming in Congressional Elections, Brennan Center for Justice (Oct. 28, 2024). These super PACS collect as much as, and sometimes more than, the party committees themselves.

In fact, candidates now include super PACs among their joint fundraising committees. See FEC, AO 2024-07: Campaign may engage in joint fundraising with a Super PAC (Sept. 6, 2024). Candidates split their fundraising with independent groups because they place equal, or nearly equal, value on contributions to such entities as they do on contributions to their own campaign committees.

Donors know this, which is why some donors are willing to break the law to make donations to super PACs. For example, in order to earn a mayor's favor that a donor believed would be good for business, the donor directed funds to independent committees understood to be supportive of the mayor. United States v. Singh, 979 F.3d 697, 707–08 (9th Cir. 2020). That included an independent expenditure committee. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Matsura, No. 14CR0388-MMA (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2014). As a foreign national, however, the law prohibited him from donating. Singh, 979 F.3d at 707 (citing 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)). Yet the Mexican national understood that donating to the independent group would redound to his benefit, so he used a straw donor scheme to secretly make the contributions, also in violation of the law. Id. He was eventually convicted. Id. at 706.

In another example, a jury convicted an individual working as a straw donor on behalf of a Malaysian national. United States v. Michel, No. 19-148-1, 2024 WL 4006545, at *1, *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2024). The Malaysian national believed contributing the funds would earn him an audience with a presidential candidate. Id. at *2. Among the recipients of the funds was a super PAC. Id. at *11. The conspirators thought contributing to the super PAC would likely earn access because they understood the benefitted candidates would value those contributions.

In yet another example, two individuals were convicted in a scheme to launder funds to a super PAC, America First Action PAC. United States v. Parnas, No. S3 19-CR-725, 2022 WL 669869, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2022). The individuals believed contributing to the super PAC would "gain [them] access to politicians to promote the Defendants' nascent businesses." United States v. Parnas, No. 19-CR-725, 2021 WL 2981567, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2021). Such contributions would only earn them access if the benefitted candidates valued those contributions.

In short, candidates value contributions to independent groups and donors know it. The independence of the recipient may "undermin[e] the value" of the contribution to the candidate somewhat, but it does not wholly eliminate it. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 214 (2014). Accordingly, the difference in risk of corruption arising from contributions to candidates and those to independent groups is not a difference in kind, but rather only one of degree. Where a contribution of $476 raises sufficient risk of corruption when donated directly to a candidate, see 20 A.M.R.S. §1015(1) ($475 limit for "legislative candidate"), a contribution multiples greater to an independent group raises the same risk, see McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 214 (a contribution to an independent group is less valuable, but "probably not [] 95%" less valuable).

C. The Court Below Ignored the Risk of Corruption and Failed to Apply the Required Analysis

The court below essentially acknowledged the record above but concluded that it was irrelevant: that Citizens United declared "as a matter of law" that independent expenditures never corrupt and so contributions to fund such expenditures axiomatically will never corrupt either. Yet a Supreme Court decision is not a "command" to "reject the evidence of your eyes and ears." Cf. George Orwell, 1984 (1983).

"Like King Canute, neither the Congress nor a court can change the forces of [human] nature." EEOC v. Colby Coll., 589 F.2d 1139, 1144 (1st Cir. 1978). Rather, Citizens United was a ruling based on the record before it. It relied on the absence of "any direct examples of votes being exchanged for … expenditures" in the McConnell record. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. 360 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 209 (D.D.C. May 1, 2003)); id. at 357 (relying on the fact "[t]he Government does not claim that [independent] expenditures have corrupted the political process" in states that permit corporate expenditures); see also id. at 356–57 (relying on Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46 (stating that independent expenditures "do[] not presently appear to pose dangers" of quid pro quo corruption (emphasis added)). It accordingly concluded that "Congress has created categorical bans on speech that are asymmetrical to preventing quid pro quo corruption." Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361 (analyzing a total ban on corporate expenditures, not a limit on significantly large ones). Consequently, as the record now provides the evidence with respect to contributions that Citizens United found absent with respect to independent expenditures, that should at least give a court pause in expanding the holding of Citizens United to this new territory.

Even if that record would not be sufficient to justify a limit on independent expenditures had it been before the Citizens United court, it at least demands more than summary dismissal with respect to contributions, which are afforded less First Amendment protection. The Court has consistently held for more than fifty years that contribution limits, unlike expenditure limits, impose "only a marginal restriction on contributor's ability to engage in free communication." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20, accord Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 241, 246–67 (2006). It is true that a contribution "serves as a general expression of support," Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20, but so too does every financial transaction. "[T]he transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor," and thus one may not bootstrap the speaker's protected interest onto the contribution. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.

Accordingly, the Court has consistently held that limits on contributions are subject to a distinct and "less[] demand[ing]" test than expenditures, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003). It "has been plain ... ever since Buckley that contribution limits would more readily clear the hurdles before them" than would independent expenditure limits. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387 (2000). Yet the district court did not apply that less demanding standard to the record before it. Rather it uncritically applied the conclusion from Citizens United which resulted from a higher, nonapplicable, standard.

For their part, the Appellees merely wave away the inconvenient evidence. They claim there is no evidence that contributions to independent expenditure groups can corrupt because they simply redefine a 'contribution to an independent group' as one that involves no corruption. Of course, the fact that some contributions to independent expenditure groups may be "outright bribes" is the entire point. If a contribution to a super PAC can involve "an outright bribe," then contributions can be restricted to "prevent[] quid pro quo" corruption, FEC v. Cruz, 596 U.S. at 305.

Corrupting contributions are also not necessarily the result of a candidate's solicitation or will result in a coordinated communication. Rather, officials have agreed to illicit quid pro quos, risking serious criminal penalties, even if the contribution is unsolicited or the expenditure will be independent. They do so because they in fact value contributions to independent but supportive groups just as they do "contributions to [their] campaign." Even if the group is formally independent, the fact that it will reliably convert those funds into support—even if that support is split among other candidates—makes those contributions valuable. There is no way for the public to determine ahead of time which contributions will result in a quid pro quo and which will not. Accordingly, that value creates the risk of a quid pro quo that the First Amendment permits the State of Maine to "prevent[]" through contribution limits. FEC v. Cruz, 596 U.S. at 305.

Indeed, Appellees admit this. Even in setting out their maximalist view that no restraint on contributions to independent expenditure groups are permitted, they include a caveat. They recognize the Government may, consistent with the First Amendment, limit contributions to independent expenditure groups from a "[]foreign source." But in conceding such a limit, Appellees concede that contributions are not the equivalent of speech and raise concerns distinct from speech that the Government may address.

Regardless of whether foreigners may "assert rights under the U.S. Constitution," Agency for Int'l Dev. v. All. For Open Soc'y Int'l Inc., 591 U.S. 430, 434 (2020), "the essence of self-government" undergirds the First Amendment "rights of the citizens of the country to … hear [an alien] explain and seek to defend his views." Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 764 (1972); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("[T]he Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas … regardless of their social worth.")); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (protecting First Amendment rights of American to receive from abroad materials labeled "communist political propaganda"). Were it otherwise, the Government could ban works like Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, Locke's Treatise on Law, or de Tocqueville's Democracy in America; or Rousseau, Burke, Paine, Hayek, Aristotle, or Plato; or the Bible simply because of their authors' foreign status and location.

Financial support is, however, distinct, even if it is eventually spent to create speech. See Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd 565 U.S. 1104 (2012). Like a personal gift, a contribution does not persuade; rather it "influence[s]." Id.; cf. United States v. Martinez, 994 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2021) (gifts given to "influence[]" official action support bribery charge). That is, a contribution does not alter minds by convincing them of the merit of some cause; it appeals to a benefactor's avarice. A pledge to contribute millions of dollars can sway a candidate's opinion notwithstanding the fact those funds have not yet been spent on speech that could persuade, and that will likely be spent on speech (if ever) unrelated to the matter to be influenced. See, e.g., Kenneth P. Vogel, Sarah Kliff, and Katie Thomas, Trump Delayed a Medicare Change After Health Company Donations, N.Y. Times (Aug. 7, 2025) (noting Trump changed policy position to align with company that donated $5 million to allied super PAC shortly after contribution). Such funds influence well before they are turned into speech "presented to the electorate" to "persuade voters." Cf. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.

Accordingly, although a foreigner may attempt to persuade through speech, even on electoral matters, the Court has approved restraints on foreigners' ability to "influence" through their largess. Id.; see also id. at 289–90 (distinguishing the "right to speak" from "an expressive act" like "[s]pending money to … expressly advocate for or against the election of a political candidate" that "is both speech and participation in democratic self-government"); id. at 291 (noting decision does not apply to prohibition on "foreign nationals from engaging in speech other than contributions to candidates and parties, express-advocacy expenditures, and donations to outside groups to be used for contributions to candidates and parties and express-advocacy expenditures").

Of course, the Court has also said, at least with respect to American money, that "influence" is not necessarily the same as "quid pro quo" corruption and, to ensure "breathing space" for speech, that states may not seek to combat the former when it does not amount to the latter. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 329, 359–60. But the fact that a quid can buy influence means that same quid can buy official acts if it is sufficiently large. The logic of Appellees' concession, at least with respect to foreign contributions, that contributions to independent expenditure groups can buy influence that is distinct from persuasion means that, with respect to all contributors, such contributions can buy quid pro quos if sufficiently large.

The record here establishes that contributions to independent expenditure groups not only buy influence, but can and have resulted in quid pro quo arrangements. That record was not before the Court in Citizens United nor any other court to consider limits on such contributions. Even if that record would not have altered the Court's conclusion with respect to direct limits on expenditures, the "logic of Citizens United" does not "dictat[e]" a similar result with respect to financial transfers, that only "marginal[ly] restrict[] [a] contributor's ability to engage in free communication," Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20, and is subject to a "less[] demand[ing]" analysis, McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136. The court below erred in not applying that analysis and should be reversed.